Tag Archives: central bank

by

The IMF Changes its Rules to Isolate China and Russia

No comments yet

Categories: Home 1st Page, Tags: , ,

The nightmare scenario of U.S. geopolitical strategists seems to be coming true: foreign economic independence from U.S. control. Instead of privatizing and neoliberalizing the world under U.S.-centered financial planning and ownership, the Russian and Chinese governments are investing in neighboring economies on terms that cement Eurasian economic integration on the basis of Russian oil and tax exports and Chinese financing. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) threatens to replace the IMF and World Bank programs that favor U.S. suppliers, banks and bondholders (with the United States holding unique veto power).

Russia’s 2013 loan to Ukraine, made at the request of Ukraine’s elected pro-Russian government, demonstrated the benefits of mutual trade and investment relations between the two countries. As Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov points out, Ukraine’s “international reserves were barely enough to cover three months’ imports, and no other creditor was prepared to lend on terms acceptable to Kiev. Yet Russia provided $3 billion of much-needed funding at a 5 per cent interest rate, when Ukraine’s bonds were yielding nearly 12 per cent.”[1]

What especially annoys U.S. financial strategists is that this loan by Russia’s sovereign debt fund was protected by IMF lending practice, which at that time ensured collectability by withholding new credit from countries in default of foreign official debts (or at least, not bargaining in good faith to pay). To cap matters, the bonds are registered under London’s creditor-oriented rules and courts.

On December 3 (one week before the IMF changed its rules so as to hurt Russia), Prime Minister Putin proposed that Russia “and other Eurasian Economic Union countries should kick-off consultations with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a possible economic partnership.”[2] Russia also is seeking to build pipelines to Europe through friendly instead of U.S.-backed countries.

Moving to denominate their trade and investment in their own currencies instead of dollars, China and Russia are creating a geopolitical system free from U.S. control. After U.S. officials threatened to derange Russia’s banking linkages by cutting it off from the SWIFT interbank clearing system, China accelerated its creation of the alternative China International Payments System (CIPS), with its own credit card system to protect Eurasian economies from the shrill threats made by U.S. unilateralists.

Russia and China are simply doing what the United States has long done: using trade and credit linkages to cement their geopolitical diplomacy. This tectonic geopolitical shift is a Copernican threat to New Cold War ideology: Instead of the world economy revolving around the United States (the Ptolemaic idea of America as “the indispensible nation”), it may revolve around Eurasia. As long as the global financial papacy remains grounded in Washington at the offices of the IMF and World Bank, such a shift in the center of gravity will be fought with all the power of the American Century (indeed, American Millennium) inquisition.

Imagine the following scenario five years from now. China will have spent half a decade building high-speed railroads, ports power systems and other construction for Asian and African countries, enabling them to grow and export more. These exports will be coming on line to repay the infrastructure loans. Also, suppose that Russia has been supplying the oil and gas energy needed for these projects.

To U.S. neocons this specter of AIIB government-to-government lending and investment creates fear of a world independent of U.S. control. Nations would mint their own money and hold each other’s debt in their international reserves instead of borrowing or holding dollars and subordinating their financial planning to the IMF and U.S. Treasury with their demands for monetary bloodletting and austerity for debtor countries. There would be less need for foreign government to finance budget shortfalls by selling off their key public infrastructure privatizing their economies. Instead of dismantling public spending, the AIIB and a broader Eurasian economic union would do what the United States itself practices, and seek self-sufficiency in basic needs such as food, technology, banking, credit creation and monetary policy.

With this prospect in mind, suppose an American diplomat meets with the leaders of debtors to China, Russia and the AIIB and makes the following proposal: “Now that you’ve got your increased production in place, why repay? We’ll make you rich if you stiff our New Cold War adversaries and turn to the West. We and our European allies will help you assign the infrastructure to yourselves and your supporters, and give these assets market value by selling shares in New York and London. Then, you can spend your surpluses in the West.”

How can China or Russia collect in such a situation? They can sue. But what court will recognize their claim – that is, what court that the West would pay attention to?

That is the kind of scenario U.S. State Department and Treasury officials have been discussing for more than a year. The looming conflict was made immediate by Ukraine’s $3 billion debt to Russia falling due by December 20, 2015. Ukraine’s U.S.-backed regime has announced its intention to default. U.S. lobbyists have just changed the IMF rules to remove a critical lever on which Russia and other governments have long relied to enforce payment of their loans.

The IMF’s role as enforcer of inter-government debts

When it comes down to enforcing nations to pay inter-government debts, the International Monetary Fund and Paris Club hold the main leverage. As coordinator of central bank “stabilization” loans (the neoliberal euphemism for imposing austerity and destabilizing debtor economies, Greece-style), the IMF is able to withhold not only its own credit but also that of governments and global banks participating when debtor countries need refinancing. Countries that do not agree to privatize their infrastructure and sell it to Western buyers are threatened with sanctions, backed by U.S.-sponsored “regime change” and “democracy promotion” Maidan-style.

This was the setting on December 8, when Chief IMF Spokesman Gerry Rice announced: “The IMF’s Executive Board met today and agreed to change the current policy on non-toleration of arrears to official creditors.” The creditor leverage that the IMF has used 2KillingTheHost_Cover_ruleis that if a nation is in financial arrears to any government, it cannot qualify for an IMF loan – and hence, for packages involving other governments. This has been the system by which the dollarized global financial system has worked for half a century. The beneficiaries have been creditors in US dollars.

In this U.S.-centered worldview, China and Russia loom as the great potential adversaries – defined as independent power centers from the United States as they create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an alternative to NATO, and the AIIB as an alternative to the IMF and World Bank tandem. The very name, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, implies that transportation systems and other infrastructure will be financed by governments, not relinquished into private hands to become rent-extracting opportunities financed by U.S.-centered bank credit to turn the rent into a flow of interest payments.

The focus on a mixed public/private economy sets the AIIB at odds with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and its aim of relinquishing government planning power to the financial and corporate sector for their own short-term gains, and above all the aim of blocking government’s money-creating power and financial regulation. Chief Nomura economist Richard Koo, explained the logic of viewing the AIIB as a threat to the US-controlled IMF: “If the IMF’s rival is heavily under China’s influence, countries receiving its support will rebuild their economies under what is effectively Chinese guidance, increasing the likelihood they will fall directly or indirectly under that country’s influence.”[3]

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov accused the IMF decision of being “hasty and biased.”[4] But it had been discussed all year long, calculating a range of scenarios for a long-term sea change in international law. The aim of this change is to isolate not only Russia, but even more China in its role as creditor to African countries and prospective AIIB borrowers. U.S. officials walked into the IMF headquarters in Washington with the legal equivalent of financial suicide vests, having decided that the time had come to derail Russia’s ability to collect on its sovereign loan to Ukraine, and of even larger import, China’s plan for a New Silk Road integrating a Eurasian economy independent of U.S. financial and trade control. Anders Aslund, senior fellow at the NATO-oriented Atlantic Council, points out:

The IMF staff started contemplating a rule change in the spring of 2013 because nontraditional creditors, such as China, had started providing developing countries with large loans. One issue was that these loans were issued on conditions out of line with IMF practice. China wasn’t a member of the Paris Club, where loan restructuring is usually discussed, so it was time to update the rules.

The IMF intended to adopt a new policy in the spring of 2016, but the dispute over Russia’s $3 billion loan to Ukraine has accelerated an otherwise slow decision-making process.[5]

The Wall Street Journal concurred that the underlying motivation for changing the IMF’s rules was the threat that Chinese lending would provide an alternative to IMF loans and its demands for austerity. “IMF-watchers said the fund was originally thinking of ensuring China wouldn’t be able to foil IMF lending to member countries seeking bailouts as Beijing ramped up loans to developing economies around the world.”[6] In short, U.S. strategists have designed a policy to block trade and financial agreements organized outside of U.S. control and that of the IMF and World Bank in which it holds unique veto power.

The plan is simple enough. Trade follows finance, and the creditor usually calls the tune. That is how the United States has used the Dollar Standard to steer Third World trade and investment since World War II along lines benefiting the U.S. economy.

The cement of trade credit and bank lending is the ability of creditors to collect on the international debts being negotiated. That is why the United States and other creditor nations have used the IMF as an intermediary to act as “honest broker” for loan consortia. (“Honest broker” means in practice being subject to U.S. veto power.) To enforce its financial leverage, the IMF has long followed the rule that it will not sponsor any loan agreement or refinancing for governments that are in default of debts owed to other governments. However, as the afore-mentioned Aslund explains, the IMF could easily change its practice of not lending into [countries in official] arrears … because it is not incorporated into the IMF Articles of Agreement, that is, the IMF statutes. The IMF Executive Board can decide to change this policy with a simple board majority. The IMF has lent to Afghanistan, Georgia, and Iraq in the midst of war, and Russia has no veto right, holding only 2.39 percent of the votes in the IMF. When the IMF has lent to Georgia and Ukraine, the other members of its Executive Board have overruled Russia.[7]

After the rules change, Aslund later noted, “the IMF can continue to give Ukraine loans regardless of what Ukraine does about its credit from Russia, which falls due on December 20. [8]

Inasmuch as Ukraine’s official debt to Russia’s sovereign debt fund was not to the U.S. Government, the IMF announced its rules change as a “clarification.” Its rule that no country can borrow if it is in default to (or not seriously negotiating with) a foreign government was created in the post-1945 world, and has governed the past seventy years in which the United States Government, Treasury officials and/or U.S. bank consortia have been party to nearly every international bailout or major loan agreement. What the IMF rule really meant was that it would not provide credit to countries in arrears specifically to the U.S. Government, not those of Russia or China.

Mikhail Delyagin, Director of the Institute of Globalization Problems, understood the IMF’s double standard clearly enough: “The Fund will give Kiev a new loan tranche on one condition that Ukraine should not pay Russia a dollar under its $3 billion debt. Legally, everything will be formalized correctly but they will oblige Ukraine to pay only to western creditors for political reasons.”[9] It remains up to the IMF board – and in the end, its managing director – whether or not to deem a country creditworthy. The U.S. representative naturally has always blocked any leaders not beholden to the United States.

The post-2010 loan packages to Greece are a notorious case in point. The IMF staff calculated that Greece could not possibly pay the balance that was set to bail out foreign banks and bondholders. Many Board members agreed (and subsequently have gone public with their whistle-blowing). Their protests didn’t matter. Dominique Strauss-Kahn backed the US-ECB position (after President Barack Obama and Treasury secretary Tim Geithner pointed out that U.S. banks had written credit default swaps betting that Greece could pay, and would lose money if there were a debt writedown). In 2015, Christine Lagarde also backed the U.S.-European Central Bank hard line, against staff protests.[10]

IMF executive board member Otaviano Canuto, representing Brazil, noted that the logic that “conditions on IMF lending to a country that fell behind on payments [was to] make sure it kept negotiating in good faith to reach agreement with creditors.”[11] Dropping this condition, he said, would open the door for other countries to insist on a similar waiver and avoid making serious and sincere efforts to reach payment agreement with creditor governments.

A more binding IMF rule is that it cannot lend to countries at war or use IMF credit to engage in warfare. Article I of its 1944-45 founding charter ban the fund from lending to a member state engaged in civil war or at war with another member state, or for military purposes in general. But when IMF head Lagarde made the last IMF loan to Ukraine, in spring 2015, she made a token gesture of stating that she hoped there would be peace. But President Porochenko immediately announced that he would step up the civil war with the Russian-speaking population in the eastern Donbass region.

The problem is that the Donbass is where most Ukrainian exports were made, mainly to Russia. That market is being lost by the junta’s belligerence toward Russia. This should have blocked Ukraine from receiving IMF aid. Withholding IMF credit could have been a lever to force peace and adherence to the Minsk agreements, but U.S. diplomatic pressure led that opportunity to be rejected.

The most important IMF condition being violated is that continued warfare with the East prevents a realistic prospect of Ukraine paying back new loans. Aslund himself points to the internal contradictions at work: Ukraine has achieved budget balance because the inflation and steep currency depreciation has drastically eroded its pension costs. The resulting lower value of pension benefits has led to growing opposition to Ukraine’s post-Maidan junta. “Leading representatives from President Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc are insisting on massive tax cuts, but no more expenditure cuts; that would cause a vast budget deficit that the IMF assesses at 9-10 percent of GDP, that could not possibly be financed.”[12] So how can the IMF’s austerity budget be followed without a political backlash?

The IMF thus is breaking four rules: Not lending to a country that has no visible means to pay back the loan breaks the “No More Argentinas” rule adopted after the IMF’s disastrous 2001 loan. Not lending to countries that refuse in good faith to negotiate with their official creditors goes against the IMF’s role as the major tool of the global creditors’ cartel. And the IMF is now lending to a borrower at war, indeed one that is destroying its export capacity and hence its balance-of-payments ability to pay back the loan. Finally, the IMF is lending to a country that has little likelihood of refuse carrying out the IMF’s notorious austerity “conditionalities” on its population – without putting down democratic opposition in a totalitarian manner. Instead of being treated as an outcast from the international financial system, Ukraine is being welcomed and financed.

The upshot – and new basic guideline for IMF lending – is to create a new Iron Curtain splitting the world into pro-U.S. economies going neoliberal, and all other economies, including those seeking to maintain public investment in infrastructure, progressive taxation and what used to be viewed as progressive capitalism. Russia and China may lend as much as they want to other governments, but there is no international vehicle to help secure their ability to be paid back under what until now has passed for international law. Having refused to roll back its own or ECB financial claims on Greece, the IMF is quite willing to see repudiation of official debts owed to Russia, China or other countries not on the list approved by the U.S. neocons who wield veto power in the IMF, World Bank and similar global economic institutions now drawn into the U.S. orbit. Changing its rules to clear the path for the IMF to make loans to Ukraine and other governments in default of debts owed to official lenders is rightly seen as an escalation of America’s New Cold War against Russia and also its anti-China strategy.

Timing is everything in such ploys. Georgetown University Law professor and Treasury consultant Anna Gelpern warned that before the “IMF staff and executive board [had] enough time to change the policy on arrears to official creditors,” Russia might use “its notorious debt/GDP clause to accelerate the bonds at any time before December, or simply gum up the process of reforming the IMF’s arrears policy.”[13] According to this clause, if Ukraine’s foreign debt rose above 60 percent of GDP, Russia’s government would have the right to demand immediate payment. But no doubt anticipating the bitter fight to come over its attempts to collect on its loan, President Putin patiently refrained from exercising this option. He is playing the long game, bending over backward to accommodate Ukraine rather than behaving “odiously.”

A more pressing reason deterring the United States from pressing earlier to change IMF rules was that a waiver for Ukraine would have opened the legal floodgates for Greece to ask for a similar waiver on having to pay the “troika” – the European Central Bank (ECB), EU commission and the IMF itself – for the post-2010 loans that have pushed it into a worse depression than the 1930s. “Imagine the Greek government had insisted that EU institutions accept the same haircut as the country’s private creditors,” Russian finance minister Anton Siluanov asked. “The reaction in European capitals would have been frosty. Yet this is the position now taken by Kiev with respect to Ukraine’s $3 billion eurobond held by Russia.”[14]

Only after Greece capitulated to eurozone austerity was the path clear for U.S. officials to change the IMF rules in their fight to isolate Russia. But their tactical victory has come at the cost of changing the IMF’s rules and those of the global financial system irreversibly. Other countries henceforth may reject conditionalities, as Ukraine has done, and ask for write-downs on foreign official debts.

That was the great fear of neoliberal U.S. and Eurozone strategists last summer, after all. The reason for smashing Greece’s economy was to deter Podemos in Spain and similar movements in Italy and Portugal from pursuing national prosperity instead of eurozone austerity. Opening the door to such resistance by Ukraine is the blowback of America’s tactic to make a short-term financial hit on Russia while its balance of payments is down as a result of collapsing oil and gas prices.

The consequences go far beyond just the IMF. The fabric of international law itself is being torn apart. Every action has a reaction in the Newtonian world of geopolitics. It may not be a bad thing, to be sure, for the post-1945 global order to be broken apart by U.S. tactics against Russia, if that is the catalyst driving other countries to defend their own economies in the legal and political spheres. It has been U.S. neoliberals themselves who have catalyzed the emerging independent Eurasian bloc.

Countering Russia’s ability to collect in Britain’s law courts

Over the past year the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have discussed ploys to block Russia from collecting under British law, where its loans to Ukraine are registered. Reviewing the repertory of legal excuses Ukraine might use to avoid paying Russia, Prof. Gelpern noted that it might declare the debt “odious,” made under duress or corruptly. In a paper for the Peterson Institute of International Economics (the banking lobby in Washington) she suggested that Britain should deny Russia the use of its courts as an additional sanction reinforcing the financial, energy, and trade sanctions to those passed against Russia after Crimea voted to join it as protection against the ethnic cleansing from the Right Sector, Azov Battalion and other paramilitary groups descending on the region.[15]

A kindred ploy might be for Ukraine to countersue Russia for reparations for “invading” it, for saving Crimea and the Donbass region from the Right Sector’s attempt to take over the country. Such a ploy would seem to have little chance of success in international courts (without showing them to be simply arms of NATO New Cold War politics), but it might delay Russia’ ability to collect by tying the loan up in a long nuisance lawsuit.

To claim that Ukraine’s debt to Russia was “odious” or otherwise illegitimate, “President Petro Poroshenko said the money was intended to ensure Yanukovych’s loyalty to Moscow, and called the payment a ‘bribe,’ according to an interview with Bloomberg in June this year.”[16] The legal and moral problem with such arguments is that they would apply equally to IMF and US loans. Claiming that Russia’s loan is “odious” is that this would open the floodgates for other countries to repudiate debts taken on by dictatorships supported by IMF and U.S. lenders, headed by the many dictatorships supported by U.S. diplomacy.

The blowback from the U.S. multi-front attempt to nullify Ukraine’s debt may be used to annul or at least write down the destructive IMF loans made on the condition that borrowers accept privatizations favoring U.S., German and other NATO-country investors, undertake austerity programs, and buy weapons systems such as the German submarines that Greece borrowed to pay for. As Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted: “This reform, which they are now trying to implement, designed to suit Ukraine only, could plant a time bomb under all other IMF programs.” It certainly showed the extent to which the IMF is subordinate to U.S. aggressive New Cold Warriors: “Essentially, this reform boils down to the following: since Ukraine is politically important – and it is only important because it is opposed to Russia – the IMF is ready to do for Ukraine everything it has not done for anyone else, and the situation that should 100 percent mean a default will be seen as a situation enabling the IMF to finance Ukraine.”[17]

Andrei Klimov, deputy chairman of the Committee for International Affairs at the Federation Council (the upper house of Russia’s parliament) accused the United States of playing “the role of the main violin in the IMF while the role of the second violin is played by the European Union. These are two basic sponsors of the Maidan – the symbol of a coup d’état in Ukraine in 2014.”[18]

Putin’s counter-strategy and the blowback on U.S.-European and global relations

As noted above, having anticipated that Ukraine would seek reasons to not pay the Russian loan, President Putin carefully refrained from exercising Russia’s right to demand immediate payment when Ukraine’s foreign debt rose above 60 percent of GDP. In November he offered to defer payment if the United States, Europe and international banks underwrote the obligation. Indeed, he even “proposed better conditions for this restructuring than those the International Monetary Fund requested of us.” He offered “to accept a deeper restructuring with no payment this year – a payment of $1 billion next year, $1 billion in 2017, and $1 billion in 2018.” If the IMF, the United States and European Union “are sure that Ukraine’s solvency will grow,” then they should “see no risk in providing guarantees for this credit.” Accordingly, he concluded “We have asked for such guarantees either from the United States government, the European Union, or one of the big international financial institutions.” [19]

The implication, Putin pointed out, was that “If they cannot provide guarantees, this means that they do not believe in the Ukrainian economy’s future.” One professor pointed out that this proposal was in line with the fact that, “Ukraine has already received a sovereign loan guarantee from the United States for a previous bond issue.” Why couldn’t the United States, Eurozone or leading commercial banks provide a similar guarantee of Ukraine’s debt to Russia – or better yet, simply lend it the money to turn it into a loan to the IMF or US lenders?[20]

But the IMF, European Union and the United States refused to back up their happy (but nonsensical) forecasts of Ukrainian solvency with actual guarantees. Foreign Minister Lavrov made clear just what that rejection meant: “By having refused to guarantee Ukraine’s debt as part of Russia’s proposal to restructure it, the United States effectively admitted the absence of prospects of restoring its solvency. … By officially rejecting the proposed scheme, the United States thereby subscribed to not seeing any prospects of Ukraine restoring its solvency.”[21]

In an even more exasperated tone, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev explained to Russia’s television audience: “I have a feeling that they won’t give us the money back because they are crooks. They refuse to return our money and our Western partners not only refuse to help, but they also make it difficult for us.”[22] Adding that “the international financial system is unjustly structured,” he promised to “go to court. We’ll push for default on the loan and we’ll push for default on all Ukrainian debts.”

The basis for Russia’s legal claim, he explained was that the loan was a request from the Ukrainian Government to the Russian Government. If two governments reach an agreement this is obviously a sovereign loan…. Surprisingly, however, international financial organisations started saying that this is not exactly a sovereign loan. This is utter bull. Evidently, it’s just an absolutely brazen, cynical lie. … This seriously erodes trust in IMF decisions. I believe that now there will be a lot of pleas from different borrower states to the IMF to grant them the same terms as Ukraine. How will the IMF possibly refuse them?

And there the matter stands. As President Putin remarked regarding America’s support of Al Qaeda, Al Nusra and other ISIS allies in Syria, “Do you have any idea of what you have done?”

The blowback

Few have calculated the degree to which America’s New Cold War with Russia is creating a reaction that is tearing up the world’s linkages put in place since World War II. Beyond pulling the IMF and World Bank tightly into U.S. unilateralist geopolitics, how long will Western Europe be willing to forego its trade and investment interest with Russia? Germany, Italy and France already are feeling the strains. If and when a break comes, it will not be marginal but a seismic geopolitical shift.

The oil and pipeline war designed to bypass Russian energy exports has engulfed the Near East in anarchy for over a decade. It is flooding Europe with refugees, and also spreading terrorism to America. In the Republican presidential debate on December 15, 2015, the leading issue was safety from Islamic jihadists. Yet no candidate thought to explain the source of this terrorism in America’s alliance with Wahabist Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and hence with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daish as a means of destabilizing secular regimes seeking independence from U.S. control.

As its allies in this New Cold War, the United States has chosen fundamentalist jihadist religion against secular regimes in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and earlier in Afghanistan and Turkey. Going back to the original sin of CIA hubris – overthrowing the secular Iranian Prime Minister leader Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 – American foreign policy has been based on the assumption that secular regimes tend to be nationalist and resist privatization and neoliberal austerity.

Based on this fatal long-term assumption, U.S. Cold Warriors have aligned themselves not only against secular regimes, but against democratic regimes where these seek to promote their own prosperity and economic independence, and to resist neoliberalism in favor of maintaining their traditional mixed public/private economy.

This is the back story of the U.S. fight to control the rest of the world. Tearing apart the IMF’s rules is only the most recent chapter. The broad drive against Russia, China and their prospective Eurasian allies has deteriorated into tactics without a realistic understanding of how they are bringing about precisely the kind of world they are seeking to prevent – a multilateral world.

Arena by arena, the core values of what used to be American and European social democratic ideology are being uprooted. The Enlightenment’s ideals of secular democracy and the rule of international law applied equally to all nations, classical free market theory (of markets free from unearned income and rent extraction by special vested interests), and public investment in infrastructure to hold down the cost of living and doing business are to be sacrificed to a militant U.S. unilateralism as “the indispensible nation.” Standing above the rule of law and national interests, American neocons proclaim that their nation’s destiny is to wage war to prevent foreign secular democracy from acting in ways other than submission to U.S. diplomacy. In practice, this means favoring special U.S. financial and corporate interests that control American foreign policy.

This is not how the Enlightenment was supposed to turn out. Classical industrial capitalism a century ago was expected to evolve into an economy of abundance. Instead, we have Pentagon capitalism, finance capitalism deteriorating into a polarized rentier economy, and old-fashioned imperialism.

The Dollar Bloc’s financial Iron Curtain

By treating Ukraine’s nullification of its official debt to Russia’s Sovereign Wealth Fund as the new norm, the IMF has blessed its default on its bond payment to Russia. President Putin and foreign minister Lavrov have said that they will sue in British courts. But does any court exist in the West not under the thumb of U.S. veto?

What are China and Russia to do, faced with the IMF serving as a kangaroo court whose judgments are subject to U.S. veto power? To protect their autonomy and self-determination, they have created alternatives to the IMF and World Bank, NATO and behind it, the dollar standard.

America’s recent New Cold War maneuvering has shown that the two Bretton Woods institutions are unreformable. It is easier to create new institutions such as the A.I.I.B. than to retrofit old and ill-designed ones burdened with the legacy of their vested founding interests. It is easier to expand the Shanghai Cooperation Organization than to surrender to threats from NATO.

U.S. geostrategists seem to have imagined that if they exclude Russia, China and other SCO and Eurasian countries from the U.S.-based financial and trade system, these countries will find themselves in the same economic box as Cuba, Iran and other countries have been isolated by sanctions. The aim is to make countries choose between impoverishment from such exclusion, or acquiescing in U.S. neoliberal drives to financialize their economies and impose austerity on their government sector and labor.

What is lacking from such calculations is the idea of critical mass. The United States may use the IMF and World Bank as levers to exclude countries not in the U.S. orbit from participating in the global trade and financial system, and it may arm-twist Europe to impose trade and financial sanctions on Russia. But this action produces an equal and opposite reaction. That is the eternal Newtonian law of geopolitics. The indicated countermeasure is simply for other countries to create their own international financial organization as an alternative to the IMF, their own “aid” lending institution to juxtapose to the U.S.-centered World Bank.

All this requires an international court to handle disputes that is free from U.S. arm-twisting to turn international law into a kangaroo court following the dictates of Washington. The Eurasian Economic Union now has its own court to adjudicate disputes. It may provide an alternative Judge Griesa‘s New York federal court ruling in favor of vulture funds derailing Argentina’s debt negotiations and excluding it from foreign financial markets. If the London Court of International Arbitration (under whose rules Russia’s bonds issued to Ukraine are registered) permits frivolous legal claims (called barratry in English) such as President Poroshenko has threatened in Ukrainian Parliament, it too will become a victim of geopolitical obsolescence.

The more nakedly self-serving and geopolitical U.S. policy is – in backing radical Islamic fundamentalist outgrowths of Al Qaeda throughout the Near East, right-wing nationalist governments in Ukraine and the Baltics – the greater the catalytic pressure is growing for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, AIIB and related Eurasian institutions to break free of the post-1945 Bretton Woods system run by the U.S. State, Defense and Treasury Departments and NATO superstructure.

The question now is whether Russia and China can hold onto the BRICS and India. So as Paul Craig Roberts recently summarized my ideas along these lines, we are back with George Orwell’s 1984 global fracture between Oceanea (the United States, Britain and its northern European NATO allies) vs. Eurasia.

Notes.

[1] Anton Siluanov, “Russia wants fair rules on sovereign debt,” Financial Times, December 10, 2015.

[2] “Putin Seeks Alliance to Rival TPP,” RT.com (December 04 2015),

https://www.rt.com/business/324747-putin-tpp-bloc-russia/. The Eurasian Economic Union was created in 2014 by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, soon joined by Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. The SCO was created in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan are scheduled to join, along with Iran, Afghanistan and Belarus as observers, and other east and Central Asian countries as “dialogue partners.” ASEAN was formed in 1967, originally by Indonesia, Malaysia the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It subsequently has been expanded. China and the AIIB are reaching out to replace World Bank. The U.S. refused to join the AIIB, opposing it from the outset.

[3] Richard Koo, “EU refuses to acknowledge mistakes made in Greek bailout,” Nomura, July 14, 2015. Richard Koo, r-koo@nri.co, jp

[4] Ian Talley, “IMF Tweaks Lending Rules in Boost for Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2015.

[5] Anders Aslund, “The IMF Outfoxes Putin: Policy Change Means Ukraine Can Receive More Loans,” Atlantic Council, December 8, 2015. On Johnson’s Russia List, December 9, 2015, #13. Aslund was a major defender of neoliberal shock treatment and austerity in Russia, and has held up Latvian austerity as a success story rather than a disaster.

[6] Ian Talley, op. cit.

[7] Anders Åslund, “Ukraine Must Not Pay Russia Back,” Atlantic Council, November 2, 2015 (from Johnson’s Russia List, November 3, 2015, #50).

[8] Anders Aslund, “The IMF Outfoxes Putin,” op. cit.

[9] Quoted in Tamara Zamyantina, “IMF’s dilemma: to help or not to help Ukraine, if Kiev defaults,” TASS, translated on Johnson’s Russia List, December 9, 2015, #9.

[10] I provide a narrative of the Greek disaster in Killing the Host (2015).

[11] Reuters, “IMF rule change keeps Ukraine support; Russia complains,” Dec 8, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-imf-idUSKBN0TR28Q20151208#r8em59ZOcIPIkqaD.97

[12] Anders Aslund, “The IMF Outfoxes Putin,” op. cit.

[13] Anna Gelpern, “Russia’s Bond: It’s Official! (… and Private … and Anything Else It Wants to Be …),” Credit Slips, April 17, 2015. http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/04/russias-ukraine-bond-its-official-and-private-and-anything-else-it-wants-to-be-.html

[14] Anton Siluanov, “Russia wants fair rules on sovereign debt,” Financial Times, December 10, 2015. He added: “Russia’s financing was not made for commercial gain. Just as America and Britain regularly do, it provided assistance to a country whose policies it supported. The US is now supporting the current Ukrainian government through its USAID guarantee programme.”

[15] John Helmer: IMF Makes Ukraine War-Fighting Loan, Allows US to Fund Military Operations Against Russia, May Repay Gazprom Bill,” Naked Capitalism, March 16, 2015 (from his site Dances with Bears).

[16] “Ukraine Rebuffs Putin’s Offer to Restructure Russian Debt,” Moscow Times, November 20, 2015, from Johnson’s Russia List, November 20, 2015, #32.

[17] “Lavrov: U.S. admits lack of prospects of restoring Ukrainian solvency,” Interfax, November 7, 2015, translated on Johnson’s Russia List, December 7, 2015, #38.

[18] Quoted by Tamara Zamyantina, “IMF’s dilemma,” op. cit. [fn 8].

[19] Vladimir Putin, “Responses to journalists’ questions following the G20 summit,” Kremlin.ru, November 16, 2015. From Johnson’s Russia List, November 17, 2015,  #7.

[20] Anton Tabakh, “A Debt Deal for Kiev?” Carnegie Moscow Center, November 20, 2015, on Johnson’s Russia List, November 20, 2015, #34. Tabakh is Director for regional ratings at “Rus-Rating” and associate professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

[21] “Lavrov: U.S. admits lack of prospects of restoring Ukrainian solvency,” November 7, 2015, translated on Johnson’s Russia List, December 7, 2015, #38.

[22] “In Conversation with Dmitry Medvedev: Interview with five television channels,” Government.ru, December 9, 2015, from Johnson’s Russia List, December 10, 2015,  #2

by

Listless Euro reacts to ECB doubts

No comments yet

Categories: Forex Capital Today, News Flash - Market today, Tags: , , , , , ,

The Euro was little changed earlier today, as it appears “capped” with rising doubts about whether policymakers can reach an agreement for action in September, which would provide some relief to debt stricken Euro zone countries such as Spain and Italy.

I expect the Euro to reverse in the next few days as to now, traders have been focusing on only positive indicators which could change.

A reality check is now due after the Euro has remained buoyed by hopes that the European Central Bank (ECB) would start buying bonds of the struggling Euro zone members next month. I expect the market to shift its focus back to the problems facing Euro zone policymakers as they resume talks after summer holidays.

Yesterday Germany’s Bundesbank stepped up its resistance to an ECB plan to purchase billions of Euros worth of Spanish and Italian government bonds.

The French President, Francois Hollande, and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, will meet on Thursday. On Friday Greece’s Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, arrives in Germany for talks and is expected to lobby for a two-year extension of austerity measures in order to soften their negative economic impact.

If Greece and the EU cannot reach an agreement, in such case, we could see speculation about Greece’s exit from the Euro zone rekindled.

The Euro stood little changed earlier today at $1.2350, down from its August 6th peak of $1.2440.

The Dollar was trading at 79.41 Yen, down from Monday’s five week high of 79.66 Yen.

On Wednesday the Federal Reserve is due to publish minutes of its two-day meeting that ended on the 1st of August. The Fed, which has pledged to keep its benchmark rate near zero through 2014, has refrained from adding to the $2.3 trillion in asset purchases it has already made to support the economy. It will next meet on the 12th and 13th of September.

The Aussie meanwhile has underperformed against other risk sensitive currencies recently, being down 0.2% so far in August, having only gained slightly after the minutes of the RBA’s latest meeting gave no hint of further easing. The Aussie earlier was at $1.0475, up 0.3% on the day.

All the best and trade safe.

Erik

 

by

Definitive steps taken to resolve Euro debt crisis or are we just buying time..again ??

No comments yet

Categories: News Flash - Market today, Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

The Euro surged 1.1% in its biggest daily jump in eight months. Markets now shift focus to key data releases.

The Euro shot up more than 1% earlier today, on news that European leaders have agreed that Euro zone banks could be recapitalised without adding to government debt. This did much to allay concerns about growing lending pressures in Spain and Italy.

Dollar-based oil, copper and gold recovered as the Dollar retreated following the Euro’s steep rebound.

While the finer details of the agreement are yet to be disclosed, the Euro zone members had agreed to emergency action in order to lower the borrowing costs of Spain and Italy. They reasoned that the Euro area rescue funds could be used to stabilise bond markets without forcing countries that comply with EU budget rules. They also agreed to create a single supervisory body for the Euro bloc’s banks.

Euro area finance ministers will enact the final deal on loans to Spanish banks at a meeting on July 9th.

Both Spain and Italy had been threatened by market pressure which pushed their borrowing costs to unsustainable levels. They blocked a 120 billion Euro ($149 billion) growth package at the start of the two day EU summit yesterday, in order to demand urgent action to calm their financial woes.

The EU Leaders however did not place stress on the possibility of Euro bonds. Europe’s paymaster, Germany, staunchly opposes the creation of common Euro bonds.

While the Dollar retreated against a basket of currencies, the Euro was set for its biggest daily jump in eight months and was at $1.2568 earlier today. The Euro had jumped 1.2% to 100.08 Yen after earlier falling as much as 0.3%. The Yen fetched 79.43 Yen per Dollar.

In Japan, government reports today had shown that its industrial production had slid 3.1% in May from April. This was the biggest decline since March 2011. Japan’s consumer prices declined 0.1% in May.

The Australian and New Zealand Dollars advanced as Asian stocks rose, which boosted demand for higher yielding assets. The Aussie was up 1.5% to $1.0192 and the Kiwi rallied 1.3% to 79.84 U.S. cents.

Analysts now expect that the markets will shift their focus to other key data. The monthly U.S. jobs report is due next week and the official China PMI due over the weekend, with the PMI expected to show that activity at China’s factories fell to a seven month low this month.

Data released yesterday had shown that unemployment climbed in June for the fourth month this year in Germany, the Euro currency bloc’s biggest economy. A report from the EU’s statistics office is due for release on July 2nd and is expected to show that the jobless rate in the 17 nation Euro zone was near 11.1% in May.

Stay tuned for further updates, trade safe!

Erik

by

The name of the game is Risk Aversion on Currencies !

No comments yet

Categories: Forex Capital Today, News Flash - Market today, Tags: , , , , , , ,

Earlier today, the Euro hit its weakest level since July 2010 to the Dollar. This followed a clash between European leaders over joint bond sales at a summit.

The Euro also declined for a third day against the Yen. This as a Euro area report is due, that economists predict will show that services and manufacturing industries have shrunk for a fourth month.

The Dollar and Yen have both climbed as against most of their major counterparts. Speculation still persists that Europe’s debt crisis is deepening and this has boosted demand from investors for safer assets.

The Euro stood at $1.2580 earlier from $1.2582 yesterday, when it touched its lowest level since the 13th of July 2010 at $1.2545. It dropped 0.3% to 99.71 Yen, while the Dollar stood at 79.48 Yen.

Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor, Masaaki Shirakawa, today stressed the central bank’s resolve to maintain its ultra-loose monetary policy. He ruled out though, any easing solely for the purpose of weakening the Yen.

He went on to say that there was no clear historical evidence, that an expansion in Japan’s monetary base does lead to a weaker Yen. This countered views that the central bank can directly push down the Yen by injecting more money into the economy.

He considered, that the biggest factor affecting currency moves at the moment, is investors’ risk aversion and went on to stress, that monetary policy alone cannot influence Yen moves.

In February, the BOJ had eased monetary policy and set an 1% inflation target. It did so in order to show its determination to beat the deflation that has plagued Japan for over a decade.

The BOJ had followed up with even more monetary easing during April. Since then, it has remained under political pressure for further action to support the economy and counter the hardship resulting from a stubbornly strong Yen.

The BOJ has pledged to pursue powerful monetary easing until such time that an 1% inflation figure is in sight, and will likely continue with its efforts to beat deflation with its key monetary easing tool; its asset-buying program.

On the longer term time line surely the euro will have some export easing benefit from the Euro drop, even so as it continues fall down hill.

On shorter term we still have this contagious crisis…keeps popping out as popcorn on a micro..

I can promise one thing, it is going to be a very HOT summer, did you remember last years summer ?

Yes, same thing just bigger….

All the best!

Erik

by

If you thought the debt crisis in Europe was over, think again.

No comments yet

Categories: News Flash World Economy, Tags: , , , ,

Now the main stream media start again focusing on the eurozone with its hidden problems, as I wrote you earlier on my Blog.

———–

The nearly three-year old crisis appears to be entering a new phase as the respite in global financial markets, which came after the European Central Bank flooded the banking system with cash, has faded.

The focus has once again shifted to politics, long a source of agita for investors, with elections in several key nations set to change the balance of power in the eurozone.

As the economy slides toward recession, there is renewed debate over the wisdom of austerity, which Germany has made a priority, versus policies aimed at boosting growth.

This debate could decide the outcome of elections in France, Greece and now possibly the Netherlands. It could also determine the fate of Portugal, Spain and Italy, which are all struggling to regain credibility in the bond market.

“The emergence of these new coalitions will make crisis management more acrimonious,” wrote Eurasia Group analysts in a note.

Europe: ‘Dark clouds on the horizon’

While policy makers have taken steps to contain the crisis, many of the longer term problems have yet to be resolved.

Meanwhile, the uncertain political and economic outlook is making investors nervous, putting pressure on the ECB to do even more to stabilize the financial markets.

Here are a few things to keep an eye on in the weeks ahead.

Merkozy’s days are numbered

In France, socialist candidate Francois Hollande narrowly defeated incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy in the first round of the nation’s presidential elections last weekend.

Hollande is favored to win the final round of voting on May 6, although the race could be tighter than expected.

France and Germany have been the main players in the response to the crisis to date, so much so that Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have become known as “Merkozy.”

The Merkozy doctrine, such as it is, has been to demand austerity measures from eurozone nations that have requested bailouts from the EU and International Monetary Fund.

The two leaders have also been pushing for more political and economic “integration” as the main proponents of the “fiscal compact” that euro area leaders signed late last year.
5 things to know about the French election – CNN

Hollande, however, has suggested that he would renegotiate the fiscal compact before recommending that France ratify the proposed budget rules and penalties.

He has also called for more growth-oriented policies, suggesting that Hollande could have a complicated relationship with Merkel, who favors spending cuts.

Budget fight breaks Netherlands government

Meanwhile, the Netherlands has emerged as another source of political uncertainty after an impasse over budget cuts caused the nation’s prime minister to resign.

Prime Minister Mark Rutte resigned after far-right party leader Geert Wilders withdrew his support for cuts needed to meet EU budget rules.

It was not immediately clear what will happen next, but Wilders and other Dutch politicians have reportedly called for elections as soon as possible.

The political turmoil raised worries that the Netherlands, one of the few AAA-rated eurozone nations, could have its credit rating downgraded.

Greece is still in bad shape

Amid a shrinking economy and deepening austerity, Greek voters are scheduled to elect a new government on May 6.

Greece has been run by a caretaker government since Prime Minister George Papandreou resigned late last year, under pressure from France and Germany.

Lucas Papademos, the interim prime minister, orchestrated the largest sovereign debt default in history and secured a second €130 billion bailout program during his six months in office.

To qualify for the bailout, Greece was required to enact a raft of austerity measures and agree to a program of structural reforms that will be overseen by the IMF for the next few years.

Greece has already endured years of austerity, which many economists say has worsened the nation’s recession. In addition, Greece’s debt load will still be very high and may require further restructuring even if it completes the reforms under its bailout program.

This suggests that Greece will either be forced out or will decide to abandon the euro currency union later this year, according to Capital Economics.

Domino effect: Portugal, Spain and Italy

After Greece, investors see Portugal as the most likely candidate for another bailout.

Portugal’s borrowing costs shot higher earlier this year amid fears the nation could seek to restructure its debts. Investors were also rattled after Standard & Poor’s downgraded Lisbon’s credit rating to junk in January.

In its most recent review, the IMF said that Portugal was “broadly on track” with the €78 billion bailout program the nation tapped nearly a year ago.

While the Portuguese economy is comparatively small, the nation’s woes have highlighted the challenges facing larger eurozone economies, such as Spain and Italy.

Spain recently disclosed that its 2011 budget deficit was much larger than expected and warned that the government may not meet its fiscal targets for 2012.

Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, in power since December, has proposed a €27 billion austerity program. But the Spanish economy, which is suffering from high unemployment and problems in the banking sector tied to the real estate market, has slipped back into recession.

While the authorities say Spain can avoid a bailout, yields on Spanish bonds have risen sharply recently as investors fear the nation will require some sort of external support.

Investors are also worried about Italy, the eurozone’s third-largest economy, despite progress made by Prime Minister Mario Monti on labor and other market reforms.

The concern is that if Spain needs to be bailed out, there will not be enough money left over to support Italy in the event that Monti’s reforms fall short.

Monti, who was appointed after Silvio Berlusconi stepped down late last year, has also been pushing back against austerity and emphasizing the need to stimulate growth as Italy’s economy has stagnated for years.

ECB’s options are limited

The ECB stepped up its efforts to prevent a credit crisis late last year when it offered European banks unlimited access to cheap, long-term loans.

In two separate operations, the ECB pumped over €1 trillion into the banking system.

ECB president Mario Draghi has said the goal was to help banks struggling to fund themselves amid concerns about exposure to sovereign debt. But the flood of liquidity also appeared to help drive down borrowing costs for troubled eurozone governments.

As yields move back into the danger zone, investors are again looking to the ECB to save the day.
Investors to ECB: 1 trillion euros is not enough

There is speculation that the ECB could resume limited purchases of government debt under its controversial securities market program.

Some analysts have also suggested that the ECB could move to full-blown quantitative easing, a strategy used by the Federal Reserve, to help boost the economy.

However, such steps would violate the ECB’s mandate, which is to maintain price stability, and the bank has already stepped way out of its comfort zone. In addition, intervening in the bond market raises thorny questions of “moral hazard.”

Instead, Draghi has stressed that governments must push ahead with fiscal consolidation and reforms to increase economic competitiveness.

Compiled source from: Ben Rooney – CNNmoney

by

All Central Bank Balance Sheets Are Exploding Higher!

No comments yet

Categories: News Flash - Market today, Tags: , , ,

All Central Bank Balance Sheets Are Exploding Higher, Or Engaged In QE

The degree to which central banks around the world are printing money is unprecedented.

The first eight charts below show the balance sheets of the largest central banks in the world. They are the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the Bank of England (BoE), the Bundesbank (Germany), the Banque de France, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB).  Noted on the charts are significant events or growth rates.

Shown is the size of each respective balance sheet in its local currency.  Note that all are exploding higher as every chart goes from the lower left to the upper right.  Most are still making new all-time highs. If the basic definition of quantitative easing (QE) is a significant increase in a central bank’s balance sheet via increasing banking reserves, then all eight of these central banks are engaged in QE.

 

Click to enlarge:

˜˜˜

 



 

Comparing Central Bank Balance Sheets

For comparison’s sake, we converted the eight balance sheets above into dollar terms.  The four largest, the PBoC, the Fed, the BoJ and the ECB are shown in the first chart below.  The second four, the Bundesbank, Banque de France, the BoE and SNB are shown in the second chart below.   We split them up because of their vastly different scales.

In the first chart, note that the balance sheets of the PBoC and the ECB are larger than the Federal Reserve when converted to dollars.  The BoJ used to be the largest balance sheet in dollar terms until 2006.

When shown in dollar terms below, the Bundesbank is the largest of the “second four” central banks.  Further, its growth rate over the last five years has been among the highest.  This is surprising since the Bundesbank is considered the “hard money” central bank.

Combining Central Bank Balance Sheets

The next chart below adds up the eight largest central bank balance sheets in dollar terms.  It is only current through October as that is the latest number from the PBoC.

The combined size of these eight central banks’ balance sheets has almost tripled in the last six years from $5.42 trillion to more than $15 trillion and is still on the rise!

Central Banks Equal To One-Third Of World Equity Values

As noted above, QE is an expanding of balance sheets via increasing bank reserves.  The purpose of QE, as explained by this Bank of England video,  is to increase bank reserves through purchases of fixed income securities in order to lower interest rates.  This makes fixed income securities relatively unattractive/overvalued and pushes investors out the risk curve.  This should increase buying for riskier assets such as stocks, pushing them higher in price.  Theoretically these higher prices should lead to a wealth effect and increased economic activity.

Given this definition and purpose, it is fair to compare the size of these balance sheets (now $15 trillion) to the capitalization of the world’s stock markets (now $48 trillion).  This is shown in the chart below.

Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the eight central bank balance sheets were less than 15% the size of world stock markets and falling.  In the immediate aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ failure, these eight central bank balance sheets swelled to 37% the capitalization of the world stock market.  But keep in mind that the late 2008/early 2009 peak was due to collapsing stock market values combined with balance sheet expansion via “lender of last resort” loans.

Recently, the eight central bank balance sheets have spiked back to 33% of world stock market capitalization.  This has come about not by lender of last resort loans, but rather by QE expansion (buying bonds with printed money) even faster than world stock markets are rising.

What Does It All Mean?

2011 was so difficult because all stocks seemingly moved together.  It was as if every S&P 500 company had the same chairman of the board that knew only one strategy, resulting in a high degree of correlation between seemingly unrelated companies.

Massive central bank involvement in the markets risks returning us to a de facto centrally planned economy. Those S&P 500 companies all have the same chairman; it is Ben Bernanke because his policies are affecting everybody. That is what makes money management so difficult. Correlations will ebb and flow; they always do. But what makes them go away? This will only happen when governments and central banks go away.

But if they go away, then does that not mean things get ugly? Maybe they do get ugly, but it also means that we sort out the excesses in the market. We reward the people that do the right thing and we punish the people that do the wrong thing. And we have an adjustment process that may be ugly, but then we have a period of long expansion.

Central banks are ruling markets to a degree this generation has not seen.  Collectively they are printing money to a degree never seen in human history.

So how does this process get reversed?  How do central banks pull back trillions of dollars of money printing without throwing markets into a tailspin?  Frankly, no one knows, least of all central banks as they continue to make new money printing records.

Until a worldwide exit strategy can be articulated and understood, risk markets will rise and fall based on the perceptions and realities of central bank balance sheets.  As long as this is perceived to be a good thing, like perpetually rising home prices were perceived to be a good thing, risk markets will rise.

When/If these central banks go too far, as was eventually the case with home prices, expanding balance sheets will no longer be looked upon in a positive light.  Instead they will be viewed in the same light as CDOs backed by sub-prime mortgages were when home prices were falling.  The heads of these central banks will no longer be put on a pedestal but looked upon as eight Alan Greenspans that caused a financial crisis.

The tipping point between balance sheet expansion being bullish for risk assets versus bearish is impossible to know.  Given the growth rate of central bank balance sheets around the world over the past few years, we might not have to wait too long to find out.  Enjoy it while it is still bullish.

Future will show where the giant ship is heading, stay tuned and trade safe.

Erik

Source: Bianco Research